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Abstract 
The backgrounds and modus operandi of more recent jihadi terrorists tend to share factors 
and characteristics more typically associated with non-political violence such as mass-
killings and gang violence. Their attacks, moreover, seem to have been precipitated not by the 
direct instructions of a formal hierarchy but by the encouragement of propaganda produced 
and disseminated by networked, media-savvy terrorist groups. It is necessary to explain how 
these ‘recruitment’ efforts work. Cultural criminology with its understanding of the 
relationship between mediated meaning and individual experience, can provide such an 
analysis. The paper presents a qualitative document analysis of 32 propaganda magazines 
produced by the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. It demonstrates that they contain significantly 
more than religious rhetoric and military strategy. Rather, they are part of a process that 
crystalizes a jihadi subculture that appeals to disaffected and/or marginalized, excitement-
seeking youths. The magazines cultivate violence by constructing a militarized style that 
celebrates outlaw status, where violence is eroticized and aestheticized. They idealize the 
notion of a jihadi terrorist that is tough and willing to commit brutal violence. The lifestyle 
portrayed offers the possibility of heroism, excitement, belonging and imminent fame, themes 
often espoused by conventional, Western consumer culture. The magazines occasionally draw 
on street jargon, urban music, fashion, films and video games. The subcultural model of 
jihadi propaganda we explicate provides a novel way of understanding terrorist recruiting 
tactics and motivations that are not necessarily in opposition to contemporary conventional 
criminal and ‘mainstream’ cultures, but in resonance with them.  
  
Keywords:  jihadi terrorism, terrorist propaganda, cultural criminology, subculture, 
qualitative media analysis 
 
  
Introduction 
The young men recently involved in jihadi terrorism in Western Europe tend to share a 
background in street crime and violence (Basra and Neumann, 2016). As opposed to 
exhibiting a deep and sophisticated understanding of and devotion to the Islamic faith, they 
are more notable for recent histories of hedonistic partying (Cottee, 2017) and alleged street 
gang membership (Verkaik, 2016). Social media accounts coming out of the former Caliphate 
show jihadists posing with decapitated heads, boasting about murders, and telling stories 
animated by the tales of slaughter. Characteristically, a jihadist was found with a copy of 
‘Islam for Dummies’ in his backpack (McCants, 2015). This ‘third wave’ of jihadists, as Marc 
Sageman (2008) describes them, are noted for being European-born, disaffected and 
marginalized, and linked into terrorist organizations through networks as opposed to 
command-and-control, hierarchical organizations. Groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda are 
nevertheless able to reach into European countries to recruit fighters and incite domestic 
attacks, and it remains necessary to explain how they are capable of doing this. Questions are 
rightfully emerging around the extent to which contemporary jihadi terrorism can be fully 
understood through conventional models of radicalization. 
Indeed, most scholars have focused on personal or political grievances (e.g. McCauley 
& Moskalenko, 2008) in the individual’s ‘staircase’ (e.g. Moghadam, 2005) or ‘pathway’ (e.g. 
Horgan, 2008) into radicalism (for thorough literature reviews, see Borum, 2011a; 2011b; 
Schmid, 2013; du Bois, 2019). We argue that analyzing the complex cultural architecture of 
jihadi propaganda and motivation makes sense of what might otherwise seem senseless. It can 
help by “stressing the importance of human experience and agency in the conduct of war, 
insurgency and counter insurgency” (Ferrell, Hayward & Young 2015: 128), and show how 
(seemingly) trivial matters such as storytelling, clothes, music, rituals and adrenaline are in 
fact powerful forces within a subculture. By emphasizing the immediacy, rush and positive 
emotions related to being jihadi, we energize the sociological background factors, 
psychological individual grievances, social movement-like peer-relations, and political, 
religious and ideological beliefs, and introduce a phenomenological understanding of why 
some people become jihadists.  
Utilizing cultural criminology, with its interest in the dynamic between power-
relations, meaning and experience (Ferrell, Hayward and Young, 2015; Ilan, 2019), this paper 
provides such an understanding. Analyzing a sample of propaganda magazines produced by 
ISIS and Al-Qaeda, we argue that these organizations appeal to potential jihadists along lines 
that resonate with the subcultural themes more usually associated with street culture (Ilan 
2015, see also Andersen and Sandberg, 2018; Ilan and Sandberg 2019). Readers of Inspire, 
Dabiq and Rumiyah are exposed to particular modes of being explicitly tied to participation in 
a violent and masculinity-fueled jihad: excitement, ‘cool’, fame, and embodying and 
transcending death. The power of these magazines should not be understood as only direct 
and didactic, but rather as ‘cultural’ where they portray lifestyles that potential recruits then 
aspire to. Promising a global “brotherhood”, the magazines are flashy, cool, violent and 
exciting to read, and the power of these magazines are the subcultural values the readers draw 
upon and cultivate, as well as statuses and feelings they hope to experience. In this way, they 
operate in a matter that is not too different from mainstream commercial branding, but 
obviously with significantly more grim results.  
We start by setting out how cultural criminology has become increasingly utilized to 
understand contemporary terrorism (for an overview, see Ferrell, Hayward & Young, 2015: 
Chapter 5), and argue why it is particularly useful to understand contemporary practices of 
jihadi terrorist propaganda. We then offer an empirical, inductive and qualitative analysis of 
jihadi propaganda magazines to substantiate cultural criminological arguments advanced by 
earlier scholarly works on terrorism (see, e.g., Cottee, 2011; Cottee and Hayward, 2011). 
Combined, our paper demonstrates how the subcultural model of jihadi propaganda we 
explicate provides a novel way of understanding the nature of the relationship between 
terrorist networks and the potential recruits who operate remotely from them.  
 
A Cultural Criminology of Western Jihadism  
Research has increasingly reflected on the nature of contemporary jihadist attackers. Whilst 
what Nesser (2015) describes as “misfits” have long been part of the terrorist recruitment 
pool, they seem to have become more central to it in recent years (Basra, Neumann and 
Brunner, 2016; PST, 2016; Rostami et al. 2018). In contrast to the educated, ‘elite’ recruits 
noted in previous generations, they are characterized by being socially and economically 
marginalized, displaying violent tendencies from early adolescence, and having backgrounds 
or interest in Western street cultures. The French police have declared their concerns about 
such “gangster-jihadists” (The Guardian, 2018), and at the same time, criminology is 
increasingly reflecting on the nexus between conventional and political violence. The mixing 
of street culture and jihadi networks include “embodied transformations” when gangsters turn 
jihadists (Crone, 2014; see also Walklate and Mythen, 2016; Ilan and Sanderg, 2019) and 
“aesthetic assemblages” when jihadi style is combined with street style (Crone, 2016; see also 
Cottee, 2015).  
Although some researchers have argued that it is premature to talk of a new paradigm 
in recruitment (Nesser, Stenersen and Oftedal, 2016) these are some developments that should 
be followed closely. They may also demand some other perspectives and theoretical 
frameworks than those usually applied in terrorism research. We believe that terrorism 
research dominated by political scientists, historians and religious scholars, may benefit from 
an analysis that recognizes the role played by subcultural dynamics to understand the 
techniques and appeal of contemporary Western jihadism – and the propaganda strategies 
employed by jihadi terrorism organizations. 
Cultural criminology is specifically concerned with the ways in which meaning is 
intertwined with issues of crime and its control (see e.g. Ferrell, Hayward and Young, 2015). 
It can analyze broad geo-political and socio-economic issues alongside the attribution of 
meaning at the group level and the ways in which criminal behaviors and images are 
subjectively experienced (Hayward, 2011; Ilan, 2019). Arguably, the somewhat limited 
cultural criminology of terrorism literature has tended to focus at the meso- and micro-levels, 
studying in that context the effects, more than the nature, of macro-level structures. On 
questions of terrorist motivation thus, its focus has been on matters of subculture and 
experience. This paper has a similar emphasis, but we argue that these factors are crucial to 
understand the efficacy of jihadi terrorist propaganda.    
Mark Hamm’s (2004) study of motivations amongst white-supremacist skinheads is a 
good example of a cultural criminological approach to terrorism. For them, the desire to 
participate in spectacular violence sits atop a set of subcultural beliefs and practices that 
glorified the experience of committing atrocity. A combination of celebrity (and thus status 
within their subculture) and surging feelings of power (affirmative experience) was found in 
this study to precipitate motivations towards violence amongst individuals who harbor a deep-
felt sense of marginalization. There are echoes of these findings in a paper by Simon Cottee 
(2009) who analyses the case of Dutch jihadist murderer Mohammed Bouyeri. Cottee’s 
psychosocial analysis draws on the classic subcultural theory of Albert Cohen (1955) to argue 
that jihadism harnesses the ‘status frustration’ of second-generation Muslim immigrants who 
feel like ‘losers’ despite their best efforts to thrive. Blocked from achievement within 
mainstream socio-economic life, they couch negativistic blows against perceived symbols of 
their oppression as heroic rather than delinquent. Once again, terrorism becomes a ‘solution’ 
in the Birmingham School sense (see Hall and Jefferson, 1976): a means for the marginalized 
to feel like they are transcending structured predicament.  
In a theoretical intervention Keith Hayward and Simon Cottee (2011) urge research to 
go beyond simplistic and stock explanations, to recognize the complex motivations that can 
underpin acts of violence. Specifically, they argue that an emphasis on destructive ideologies 
can obscure the role played at an individual level by the quest for excitement and glory and 
for more significant meaning. In other words, political ideologies can be claimed, adopted and 
espoused by those who have a far more ‘conventional’ (or non-ideological) drive to violence. 
If excitement and glamour are recognized as components of terrorist motivation (Silke, 2008; 
Borum, 2011) it becomes necessary therefore to analyze the propaganda of jihadi groups, not 
to interrogate the ideology present, but to examine the extent to which it implicitly 
understands this part of terrorist motivation. Does jihadi propaganda harness the power of 
subculture and the desire for status, pleasure and excitement to communicate messages and 
ultimately to precipitate violence? Whilst the literature has considered the issues of 
propaganda, subculture, marginalization and excitement seeking separately, there is arguably 
scope to better understand the relationship between them.  
Andrew Silke (2008) describes how propaganda magazines “often attempt to portray 
the jihadi lifestyle as an exciting, dangerous and meaningful one” (p. 116). Whilst cultural 
criminology has long analyzed the ‘commodification of transgression’ (Ferrell, Hayward and 
Young, 2015) what arguably is occurring here is the harnessing of consumer culture to 
precipitate transgression, in this case of the most destructive and murderous variety. 
Participation in jihadi violence is not only instrumental and political but also expressive 
involving emotions such as excitement, grief, humor, and a search for greater meaning in life 
(Cottee and Hayward, 2011; Hegghammer, 2017). To an extent, the lifestyle of jihadi cool is 
also offered to women, through what Joanne Picart (2015) terms ‘jihadi chic’. Here, 
subcultural appeal is feminized through portrayal of “good” women living the virtuous life in 
the “jihadi girl power subculture” (p. 366). Overall however, the subculture revolves around 
extreme portrayals and enactments of masculinity and this paper focuses on this where the 
vast majority of attackers tend to be male. 
Although sometimes criticized for being out-of-date and for neglecting variation and 
fragmentation in youth style (Muggleton and Weinzierl, 2003; Benneth and Kahn-Harris, 
2004), subcultural theory retains analytical purchase and is particularly suitable for tracing the 
links between image, identity, the search for excitement, pleasure and politics (Dimou and 
Ilan, 2018). Importantly, subcultures can share concerns with present but ‘subterranean’ 
elements in ‘mainstream’ or ‘parent’ cultures. This has been shown to be the case for jihadi 
terrorist cultures that are masculinist and steeped in the logic of status and sensation seeking 
(Cottee, 2019).  
We analyze jihadi propaganda content to show three important areas where 
subculturally relevant themes are active, and argue that cultural criminology is a fruitful 
framework to theoretically embed our results. First, subcultural studies and cultural 
criminology have emphasized the importance of brotherhood, rituals and belonging, often 
signaled through the adoption of common meanings and practices (see e.g. Fraser, 2017). 
Secondly, subcultures and especially those emerging from the street are frequently seen as 
celebrating or embracing “cool” and the persona of the “bad ass” (Katz, 1988). This trope and 
its significance, forms an effective thread of propaganda. Finally, cultural criminology and 
subcultural studies often emphasize how crime can be seen as edgework, in which behaviors 
generally, and participation in extremist subcultures more specifically, are understood through 
their seductive appeals (Lyng, 1990; see also Hamm, 2004). Combined, these three cultural 
criminological themes provide analytical purchase for understanding contemporary jihadi 
terrorism generally, as well as the efficacy of contemporary jihadi propaganda specifically.  
 
Method 
This study is based on a qualitative document analysis of 32 propaganda magazines published 
by Al-Qaeda (15 magazines) and IS (17 magazines). Inspire vary in length from 23 to 112 
pages and Dabiq from 38 to 83 pages. In total 2001 pages of jihadi propaganda was accessed 
and downloaded through the jihadi propaganda clearinghouse website www.jihadology.net. 
At the time of selection, our dataset contains the entire catalogue of these e-magazines. This 
was done to ensure our analyses’ validity and representativeness. We opted for these titles 
because they were the groups’ main propaganda creations available in English. As in all 
qualitative analysis, not all editions are cited or referenced directly in the paper (there is only 
space for representative quotes), but all are all included in the material that was coded and 
used as background for the analysis.” 
Step one of the analysis was organizing and initially coding the data into inductive 
descriptive main segments. First, we noted general information on each magazine, and noted 
important themes and words, phrases and jargon such as length and the names of recurring 
and important sections. This was done to gain an overview of the data, which enabled more 
thorough coding. We then did a “careful, more focused re-reading and review of data” 
(Bowen, 2009: 32) following Presser’s (2010) encouragement to “generate themes of interest 
based on intuition as well as past research on the topic” (p. 439). In doing so, we inductively 
identified and analyzed certain jargon, clothing, expressions, actions and ideals we 
conceptualized as “the jihadi subcultural style”. In step three, we employed the insights of 
cultural criminology to analyze these elements of style. Here we aimed to investigate, analyze 
and present how the jihadi subculture “produce[s] complex circuits of communication … and 
expose[s] the dynamic cultural situations out of which crime …is constructed” (Ferrell, 2015: 
401-402).  
The analysis provides thick descriptions of how the style is constructed and how it is 
performed and expressed within the e-magazines studied. Using propaganda magazines as 
data has several benefits. Primarily, this approach allows for a readily available dataset. As 
Silke (2008) notes, nearly all studies of jihadists have been conducted using second hand 
material. Few studies have used actual first-hand, qualitative data (see Della Porta, 1995; 
Oliver and Steinberg, 2005; Speckard, 2012; Hamm, 2013) and jihadi e-magazines provide an 
important insight into the constructed realm of jihadi subcultures (Huey, 2015). They are 
produced, moreover, by leading jihadi strategists and ideologues providing unrivalled insight 
into the rhetorical and media strategies used to recruit new members.   
 
Subcultural elements in Jihadi propaganda 
It is logical for terrorist organizations to seek publicity and to issue propaganda material and 
jihadist terrorists are no exception. Al-Qaeda and especially IS propaganda has included an 
extensive online presence including pictures, magazines, videos, music and videogames (Al-
Rawi, 2016). Arguably, e-magazines have been among the most influential media with Inspire 
and Dabiq crucial vehicles for jihadi propaganda aimed at a Western audience. Inspire is 
produced by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) media foundation, al-Malahem. 
As the very first English publication associated with Al-Qaeda, it hit the internet during 
summer of 2010. The magazines focus on encouraging attacks on the West, reliving 9/11, 
celebrating Osama Bin Laden (both in life and death), and feature classic reoccurring columns 
like “Open Source Jihad” and “What to Expect in Jihad”. The production is slick, and 
strikingly Westernized, characterized as “The Sports Illustrated of jihadi” (Picart, 2015: 361). 
Its impact is undisputable; indeed, an edition of Inspire was found in the backpack of one of 
the Tsarnaev brothers after the Boston Marathon bombings of 2013.   
IS’ Dabiq and Rumiyah are clearly inspired by their Al-Qaedan sister version. 
Published by the notorious al-Hayat- Media Center, it has French, German, Russian, English 
and Arabic versions (Christien, 2016). Dabiq was launched July 5th 2014, with its final edition 
on July 31st 2016. Being named after the town of Dabiq in North-Syria, the magazine changed 
its name to Rumiyah after the Caliphate lost control of the symbolically important city. The 
first release concurs with IS “Caliph” Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi declaration of the Caliphate in 
Syria and Iraq, and focuses around this. The following editions frequently commented on 
recent developments from the battlefield in Syria and Iraq and news coming out of the 
Caliphate, which vested the magazine with an immediacy and urgency.          
We study these magazines exploring, in particular, depictions of a jihadi brotherhood 
and rituals, “cool” or “bad ass” symbolism and jihadism as edgework. These elements of 
subcultural style all point towards the importance of subcultural analysis and the possible 
benefits of cultural criminology in studies of terrorist organizations.      
 
Part of the ‘Gang’: Rituals and Brotherhood  
‘Subcultures incorporate - indeed, are defined by - elaborate conventions of argot, appearance, 
aesthetics, and stylized presentation of self and thus operate as repositories of collective meaning and 
representation for their members’ (Ferrell, 1999: 403). 
The magazines focus on in-group feelings of warmth, togetherness and solidarity. 
These are particularly valuable feelings to those who feel marginalized and excluded. Bakker 
and de Bont (2016: 846) argue that membership of jihadi groups can provide “a sense of 
belonging, fraternity and comradeship, respect, recognition, acceptance by a group, identity, 
adventure, heroism”. Indeed, affirmative feelings are arguably a basis around which 
communities of shared meaning coalesce and from which inchoate political desires and 
collective actions can potentially emerge (see Dimou and Ilan, 2018). By framing violent 
jihad as a kernel of positive feeling and depicting a range of practices and rituals that promote 
in-group solidarity and subcultural meaning, the propaganda embodies a powerful message 
that can prompt an individual to perceive of political violence in positive terms. In other 
words, by foregrounding affective comforts and bonding rituals around shared meanings, the 
propaganda can be significantly more effective than a simple promotion of violent ideology.  
Jihadists are depicted and described as small groups where palpable affection between 
members, expressed as unity and brotherhood, is foundational. Throughout the e-magazines, 
we have found a clear tendency to frame everyone who wants to join the cause as a worthy 
and accepted akhi [brother]. As such, violence can be constructed in positive terms as the 
defense of one’s fictive kin: the only other people who are similar to and share understandings 
with the jihadi.  
In Dabiq’s first edition The return of the Khilafah [Caliphate] the combination of 
affective solidarity, shared meaning and subcultural practice is writ large. On its fourth page, 
a large group of jihadists are depicted on top of cars, tanks and in the streets with one finger 
pointed towards the skies. This ‘one finger salute’ is a well-known symbol and represented in 
all kinds of jihadi propaganda – the magazines, videos with fighters declaring their allegiance 
to the Caliphate, social media posts, and others. The one finger salute draws upon the tawhid 
– the declaration of the oneness of God. It is widely known in Muslim communities and 
utilized by jihadists, for example in pictures of Caliphate children, jihadi foot soldiers and in 
imagery of leaders like bin Laden and al-Baghdadi. This ‘one finger salute’ appears in nearly 
every single magazine analyzed in this study. Although a simple gesture, it is a powerful 
image which in its repetition serves to remind the viewer of the shared solidarity and 
understanding of jihadi terrorists across the various contexts in which they exist. It resonates 
with “street cool”, being reminiscent of “gang signs”. It marks a difference between beloved 
comrades (who share feelings for the gesture) and the enemy who does not. As both ritual and 
propaganda, it can achieve significantly more than simple text. 
Rumiyah’s first edition shows seven uniformed jihadists together in what appears to be 
a combat ritual. Resembling the chanting-in-huddles some sports teams do during breaks or 
before games, the jihadists seem to “energize” by putting their hands together, suggesting that 
that they will soon shout in unison. This is a common visualization throughout the dataset – in 
fact, the vast majority of pictures of jihadists outside of combat, resemble this in some way. 
Dabiq’s second edition shows the same ritual, and it appears again in the fourth. In Islamic 
tradition, this ritual is known as bay’ah, and is another way to pledge allegiance to the cause. 
More than this, it confirms the immediate commitment to one another. Just like the salute, this 
“chant” appears in both Al-Qaedan and IS propaganda, and is present in about half of the e-
magazines studied. 
In Rumiyah’s second edition several jihadists are depicted together. One specific 
warrior is the focus of the picture, underlined by the text “there is much good in jama’ah” 
[prayer in congregation]. In this way it is explicitly communicated to readers that prayer and 
togetherness are cherished and valued. Dabiq’s 12th edition shows uniformed child soldiers in 
a similar ritual. The images directly link religious rituals, connected to acts of political 
violence, to a sense of deep camaraderie – communicating that the acceptance of jihadi 
subculture provides a space for individuals to form an intimate bond and experience feelings 
of solidarity. Bonding rituals feature significantly in jihadi culture, for example in poetry 
readings, singing and dream interpretations, often connected to strong emotions 
(Hegghammer, 2018). Inspire’s 12th edition shows an image of a jihadist hugging another, and 
it is described as an event happening prior to an attack on the Yemeni government institution 
(p. 57). Love and affection to the fellow mujahideen [holy warrior], both before, during and 
after attacks, connote strong in-group bonds and feelings. The propaganda magazines 
supplement ideological encouragement to violence with a more emotional basis, 
communicating that however much jihadist warriors fight for their cause – they do so mostly 
for their brothers (see also Cottee and Hayward, 2011). Such positive emotions are 
representative of how the magazines frame the feeling and atmosphere within the group. The 
representation of these rituals serves to implicitly frame participation in violent jihad as a 
means of accessing affirmative sensations.  
Of course, sociology has long noted that affective power of ritual to generate a sense 
of inclusion and to guide individual experience and behavior (Durkheim, 1976). The way the 
rituals are presented in the magazines communicates a welcoming invitation to join a greater 
endeavor. Whilst this will require brutal and violent behavior the propaganda seems to hint 
that not only will the group’s shared meanings interpret these acts positively, but the 
individual will feel good by partaking of the warm solidarity that will be made available to 
him. Cottee and Hayward (2011: 975) argue that most research on terrorists’ feelings are 
focused on negative emotions such as grievance and hate – however, these subcultures are, 
perhaps paradoxically, filled with “positive emotions, such as love, solidarity and 
compassion”. The propaganda magazines we have studied show this clearly. 
Ferrell (1995; 1999) has shown that common aesthetic and ritual practices are a means 
by which disaffected individuals can form communities of shared meanings. In jihadi 
subculture, dedication to the “brotherhood” involves accepting a worldview where 
indiscriminate violence is celebrated. The rituals not only enforce a dedication to this meaning 
but symbolize it. Further symbols include a range of stylistic practices by which the misfit and 
frustrated “loser” can socialize himself with other (cool) people, and as will become clear in 
the next section, boost his status. Singing along to nasheeds [acapella songs, often battle 
hymns] about cutting the heads off kuffar [non-believer] and wielding the AK47-Balaclava 
combination offers the possibility of trading “loner”, “loser” or “emasculated” status for the 
kind of “cool” described in the section below. The existential frustration of being un-cool and 
alone is solved through solidarity and style (Hebdige, 1979; Pisoiu, 2015). The propaganda 
viscerally communicates to readers that such status and experiences are open to them – they 
need only join.  
 
Jihadi Cool: Celebrating the Badass  
Jihadists in social media and propaganda representations “look cool – like ninjas or video 
game warriors” (Cottee, 2015). Indeed, Sageman has written of a “jihadi cool and jihadi talk 
in Europe where it is fashionable to emulate terrorists” (2008: 159). The material below 
anatomizes this concept in greater detail and traces its deployment within the propaganda 
material analyzed. Key to understanding its effectiveness is the way in which a particular 
conception of “cool” is constructed, conveying a sense that the status and identity of the jihadi 
warrior is desirable for men to attain. Such symbolism might have a particular appeal to those 
sometimes described as the “misfits” (Nesser, 2009; 2015) in jihadi terrorist organizations. 
The extent to which this echoes certain youth marketing techniques (see Ilan, 2015) cannot be 
ignored and it is an irony that this promotion of violence against ‘the West’ owes so much to 
the most Western of institutions: advertising and the consumer culture.  
The conjuring of jihadi cool requires overcoming what might be first thought of as 
contradictions. Although militarism might more conventionally be associated with the formal 
armies fighting against IS and other terrorist organizations, it is curious that the trope of 
militarism features prominently in the stylistic markers of cool featured in the sample 
reviewed. Certainly, army surplus clothing and military wear has a distinguished history in 
street fashion (see e.g. Hebdige, 1979), potentially drawing on notions of potent masculinity 
and the potential for violence (see Ilan, 2015). The style depicted in the magazines of course 
is not of the standard uniform, but the hybrid, combats and keffiyeh wardrobe of the 
mujahideen, who are generally glorified in accompanying text. Adorned often with utility 
pockets and heavy weaponry, the style and bearing of the men communicates their 
masculinity, heroic identity and capacity for violence. The aesthetic does not conjure the drill-
step order of the formal state army, but the revolutionary chic of the freedom fighter. This is a 
powerfully virulent trope itself within Western culture as the ubiquitous image of Ernesto Che 
Guevarra suggests (see Potter and Heath, 2006).  
The jihadi hero depicted in the magazines conforms to the template for cool identified 
by Pountain and Robins (2000): that an individual can project an air of emotional detachment, 
appear to be comfortable and in control of self and the immediate environment, dedicated to a 
rarified set of tastes and aesthetics and clearly indifferent to common social expectations and 
mores. Jihadi cool is moreover inherently gendered – with the warrior most often a male. One 
can identify within the magazines, furthermore, a complementary concept - Jack Katz’ (1988) 
notion of the ‘badass’. The devil-may-care boldness and toughness embodied by seasoned 
street criminals tightly maps on to this notion of cool (Ilan, 2015), and it is this attitude that 
the magazines attribute to the jihadists they celebrate. In doing so, the magazines construct a 
subcultural frame of meaning by which heroic status is presented as well within the reach of 
readers. This message is likely to prove particularly seductive to marginalized individuals 
who feel that they have few economic or mainstream cultural routes to achieving a level of 
success and recognition. Throughout the sample, the magazines depict the mujahedeen clearly 
in these terms.  
The jihadists behind the 2015 Paris attacks are, in Dabiq’s 13th edition, depicted 
posing with guns and their uniforms under the banner “JUST TERROR”, creatively cast as 
jihadi rock stars who have just conquered Paris. Similarities to the iconic slogan of a 
ubiquitous and highly cool sportswear brand may be coincidental or something more. The 
names of the attackers are highlighted, and images of rescue workers and victims are blended 
into the background. The words “Let Paris be a lesson for those nations that wish to take 
heed” round out the magazine’s very morbid feel. This page has little informative value in 
itself and resembles a poster. It is characterized by high production values that present the 
violent jihadists as heroes, elevated into the foreground of their carnage. The message to 
readers is that violent acts are a route for individuals to obtain recognition and status not 
simply as obedient soldiers of organization and ideology, but as cool, rebellious heroes who’s 
very being merits emulating. Thus, the images of “men in long robes and shemaghs roam the 
desert with swords in sheathe. Sand swirls in the air as riders atop of black horses charge into 
the distance carrying the Black Standard” provoke feelings of “excitement and a spike in 
adrenaline due to the “badness” of the faceless soldier” (Vallee 2015: 20). Likewise, Sageman 
(2010: 130) argues that these depictions are part of what make these jihadists “the rock stars 
of young Muslim militants”.  
It is in this context of the idolization of the cool jihadi that more didactic instruction 
can then be offered. In Dabiq’s 7th edition, an article called “advice for the leaders of the 
Islamic State” (pp. 9-16) features sincere instruction such as: “You should not have more than 
three fighters in any car”, and “The leader should appoint a commander for each squad”. 
Operational suggestions are couched in the visual imagery of heroic, weapon-toting 
mujahideen, not for example instructional diagrams. The men in the photographs with their 
aesthetics, body language and facial expression communicate their embodiment of cool 
providing seduction to the propaganda whereas practical considerations are relegated to 
accompanying text, it is unlikely that the reverse would have the same impact in propaganda 
terms.   
The magazines invoke specific people and places to concretize the cool and to 
associate it with particularly significant icons. Al-Qaeda’s Inspire in its 15th edition shows 
Anwar Al-Awlaki, smiling whilst carrying a heavy rifle and a knife in his belt (p. 90). He was, 
until his death in September 2011, the editor of the magazine. Awlaki is widely recognized as 
an important figure for recruitment and radicalization in the West, and it was his idea to create 
an English magazine to branch out and reach new audiences (Picart, 2015). Rendering his 
image in a poster five years after his death seems to elevate him to a status akin to “gang 
leader”, providing a heritage and mythology to the subculture whilst at the same time 
idealizing the posture of jihadi cool. “O AQSA WE ARE COMING” is printed on the lower 
end of the page. This became something of a slogan for Al-Qaeda and is often accompanied 
by pictures of high-profile jihadists like Osama Bin Laden, the 9/11 hijackers and Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi. Several editions of Inspire use it as a “sign-off” towards the end of the magazine. 
This highly ideological aspiration to capture the city of Jerusalem is not presented in such a 
way as to promote geopolitical reflection, but instead as a defiantly cool catchphrase that 
might be uttered by the heroes of jihad. It is through conjuring cool rather than winning 
political arguments that this type of material seeks to win new followers to its cause.  
The e-magazines consistently invoke the courage of violent jihadists. Dabiq, for 
example, tends to describe their “warriors” as brave, proud and strong, addressing child 
soldiers as “cubs” (e.g. Dabiq 8: 18-20). Amedy Coulibaly, one of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo 
attackers, is praised at length in Dabiq 7 (pp. 68-71). He was, they claim, “a lion”. The 
invocation of bravery resonates with the mastery of emotion and circumstances demanded by 
the template for cool cited above. The bravery of jihadists is, however, contrasted to that of 
the formal state soldier (for similarities, see Haggerty and Bucerius, 2018), in that there is an 
outlaw element to it, yet a further marker of cool. In an interview with the very first Inspire 
magazine, Abu Basir, a leader of AQAP, describes the mujahideen as dangerous. He states 
that wherever they go, “you would find fear and terror spreading in that place” (p. 14). 
Jihadists are being celebrated not for the discipline and order that is idealized amongst 
conventional armies, but for their unpredictability and potential casual cruelty. Not only might 
these traits align with elements of the template of cool, but they can have currency within the 
hyper-cool world of street culture (see Ilan, 2015). With this message, moreover, the 
magazines seek an audience beyond those interested in geopolitics and theology to include 
those fascinated simply by violence and destruction (Andersen and Sandberg, 2018). 
The power of subcultural jihadi cool is its occupation of the symbolic realm. Its 
invocation at the level of image ensures maximum appeal where there is sufficient ambiguity 
to conceal from potential recruits dogmatic ideology, murderous violence and crushing 
infamy. By utilizing subcultural style (through the creative mix of clothing, symbols, 
nasheeds and rhetoric), jihadists can emphasize their identities instead as masculine rebels, 
who are tough and ready to fight. For those with less appetite for actual violence, there is 
always the possibility that discussing and promoting it will move them close enough to it 
without actually requiring blood to be spilled (see also Decker and Pyrooz, 2015: 106). With 
the magazines sitting within a wider ecology of communication and propaganda which spans 
other online platforms such as YouTube, Twitter and Telegram, using subtle seduction and 
reaching out to potentially wider audiences, the “jihadi cool” subcultural element of jihadi 
propaganda has much to offer terrorist organizations. This may be particularly important 
when targeting disaffected individuals, who might thus be introduced to a host of subcultural 
understandings and practices that offer the possibility of meaningful life and elevated status.   
Jihadi Edgework: Thrill-seeking and Excitement   
The e-magazines reviewed contained references throughout to experiences of excitement and 
danger in relation to political violence. The subculture thus constructs itself as an arena of 
thrills and adrenaline, in which members are promised a culturally appropriate rush of 
pleasurable sensations to accompany violence and murder. We argue that there is a direct 
appeal made, via Stephen Lyng’s (1990) notion of edgework. Here, the focus lies on the 
sensational immediacy of crime, through voluntary participating in high risk activities that 
“involve a clearly observable threat to one's physical or mental well-being or one's sense of an 
ordered existence” (p. 857). The three primary aspects of edgework are the activity itself, the 
skillset required to perform it and the individual subjective sensations in the performance of it. 
In these acts of “extreme voluntary risk taking” (Ferrell, Hayward and Young 2015: 74), 
individuals negotiate the threat of damage or death by using their skills and individual 
abilities (Lyng, 1990).  
The jihadi propaganda magazines appeal to readers who can see terrorism as an 
exciting and fulfilling alternative to feeling like a ‘loser’ with lives that are “dull, unexciting, 
unfulfilling, meaningless and solitary” (Cottee, 2011b: 456). Instead, they are presented with 
images and accounts of the exhilarating ‘moral transcendence’ (see Hamm, 2004: 335) of 
one’s own limits, society’s restrictions and the practical challenges of security and logistics 
(all within the desirable frame of jihadi cool). Cottee and Hayward (2011: 966) note that the 
carnage of terrorism may for some be experienced as “pleasurable, arousing, stimulating, 
exciting and novel” (Zimbardo and Boyd, 2009: 106; see also Haggerty and Bucerius, 2018).  
The propaganda magazines frame terrorism thus as a lifestyle of high-stakes risk-
taking and emotionally satisfying triumph, available only to those with the capacity to grasp 
it. Lyng (1990: 859-60) notes that successful edgeworkers require the skills and innate 
temperament, the “survival capacity” to “maintain control over a situation that verges on 
complete chaos”. Successfully thriving at this edge between life and death produces feelings 
of “self-realization, self-actualization or self-determination” (Lyng, 1990: 860). By 
transcending fear, individuals can compensate for perceived deficiencies and becomes more 
of a “whole” and  “real” person, allowing them to reach a true sense of authentic identity and 
wholesome participation in one's own life. Society and advertising glorify this general way of 
being (Lyng, 1990, 2004; Ferrell, Hayward and Young, 2015), as does the street culture of the 
marginalized (Ilan, 2015). The terrorist propaganda thus follows those youth marketing tactics 
that seek to add an edge of transgressive glamour and excitement to what is being sold. 
Early editions (1, 2, 4 and 5) of Inspire feature a column entitled “What to Expect in 
Jihad” offering descriptions of the jihadi lifestyle. They state, for example, that Western 
jihadists should expect to hide in plain sight, through blending in with the enemy’s culture 
and way of life. As such marginalized readers can reinterpret themselves, not as failed 
Westerners, but as canny secret agents who use their skills and mastery of self to overcome 
challenges and camouflage their true intentions until they decide to initiate violence. The 
canny spy of the James Bond variety is of course a trope highly glamourized by Western 
culture (see Cottee, 2019). The columns furthermore explain that other techniques of evasion 
may be required: escaping to rural or outdoors areas to live “off grid”. Potential jihadists are 
warned that they may be forced to live in the wild for extended periods to achieve their 
missions. These descriptions are accompanied by visuals depicting a range of exotic 
landscapes. Readers are instructed in the art of moving between points on foot, and the matter 
of challenge is highlighted – emphasizing how obstacles must be overcome. Once again, the 
rugged outdoorsman or camouflaged commando is a trope found throughout Western culture 
and advertising.  
Preparing for terrorism is thus constructed as the ultimate edgework experience. 
Evading detection is a classic example of the “sneaky thrill” described by Jack Katz (1988), 
an exciting pretense that nothing is amiss whilst transgressions are building with catastrophic 
risk always a potential (see also Cottee and Hayward, 2011). Jihadists risk long prison 
sentences or death on the one hand and the psychological strain of concealing themselves on 
the other. Survival as a jihadist whether in plain sight or off grid is represented as thus as 
constantly playing at the line between “life and death, full functionality and permanent 
disability, consciousness and unconsciousness, or sanity and insanity” (Lyng, 2014: 449). 
With this said, the magazines establish combat itself as more thrilling and affirming still.  
The e-magazines are filled with the accounts of operations. Inspire’s second edition, 
for example, shows in visual form “the mujahidin walking a very long distance in search of 
terrifying the enemies of Allah”, the moment of attack and the subsequent and successful 
retreat after “tearing apart the base of the murtadin [apostate]” (p. 28). The pictures are 
flanked by sensationalist titles: “intense explosions”, “cleaning the streets” and “base 
ambush”. The theme is danger and combat and the mujahideen are cast in the role of 
triumphant action heroes. Their search is characterized as a challenging invocation of danger, 
their success as the correct application of skill and inherent capacities. The images and text 
directly communicate the intensity of the violent experience, the visceral satisfactions of 
conquering challenges as chaos reigns in the fog of war.  
Likewise, Dabiq has many articles, interviews and columns about the dangerous jihadi 
lifestyle in the Caliphate. Dabiq edition 5 shows pictures from the “fight from wilāyah al-
anbar” (pp. 10-11), where jihadists are depicted blowing up enemy infrastructure, “hunting 
the murtad” and “pounding the sahwat” [Muslims fighting against IS]. Later, the magazine 
shows mujahideen “advancing against the Sahwah factions in Yarmük” (edition 9: 35). 
Indeed there is a frequency and consistency to the ways in which graphic, detailed, action-
orientated reports of “operations” around the world (including Europe) are featured (see e.g. 
Dabiq editions 12: 26-29; 13: 26-29; 15: 40-45). The visual presentation and charged 
language of these reports resonate with familiar tropes from Western culture: the highly 
marketable action movie and popular “shooter” video game. In this way the magazines can go 
beyond the mere explicit communication of information, at the affective level they implicitly 
communicate a feeling (see Young, 2009) of excitement, intensity, affirmation, even pleasure. 
Drawing from the subcultural meanings and frames established, the magazines thus construct 
these feelings as accompanying the acquisition of status. There is a clear offering here to 
those who might be more interested in violence, thrill-seeking and/or self-affirmation than 
they are in theology or geopolitics.  
 
Conclusion 
In order to be most effective, jihadi e-magazines must balance different audiences, for 
example broader Muslim audiences and young excitement seeking (usually men) fascinated 
by violence (Andersen and Sandberg, 2018). They can maintain a more “general” appeal 
through harnessing existing tropes from popular media and culture. There is jihadi imagery 
that invokes superheroes (Ostovar, 2017), and jihadi videos and video games that adhere to 
familiar action genres and frames (Lakomy, 2017; Al-Rawi, 2018). Jihadi groups have 
harnessed styles and tropes from counterculture (Hemmingsen, 2014) and subcultural style 
(Pisoiu, 2015; Andersen and Sandberg, 2018). Whilst this content might seem counter-
intuitive given the austere religious convictions professed by members of these terrorist 
groups, they arguably demonstrate an inherent awareness of the kinds of individuals who may 
prove motivated to commit political violence in contemporary times and the kinds of media 
that might most effectively carry a message to them.  
Hemmingsen (2014) argues that the outlaw elements of jihadi culture provide the 
space for those involved in it to build a common identity together. We have shown that the 
cementing of a common identity and affective solidarity underpins shared understandings of 
what kind of behavior is valuable and why. The propaganda defines violent jihad as a space of 
in-group feelings of warmth, togetherness and brotherhood (Cottee and Hayward, 2011). 
There is the construction of a subcultural style where “being bad is good” (Colvin and Pisoiu, 
2018), and the tough bad-ass or “cool” persona, broadly appealing in contemporary youth 
culture is embraced. We demonstrate finally that the magazines are full of representations of 
edgework, excitement and danger (Lyng, 1980), which are presented as pleasurable 
experiences worth pursuing. 
All these three elements of subcultural style present in contemporary Western jihadist 
propaganda may appeal particularly to socio-economic excluded youths, those who perceive 
themselves to be in a hopeless situation of continuous marginalization and stigmatization 
(whether or not these perceptions are more objectively justifiable). The offer of brotherhood 
(being part of the “gang”), the status that accompanies being “cool” or “bad” and powerful 
edgework experiences are likely to be tempting to those who feel they lack the conventional 
means to acquire them. These are similar to the mechanisms that draw marginalized urban 
youths to street culture (Ilan, 2015), and many of the new jihadi recruits have a background in 
urban marginalization (Basra and Neumann, 2016). There may be a thin line between violent 
subcultures and politico-religious extremism, and between “gangsters” and violent jihadists 
(Ilan and Sandberg, 2019).  
Jihadi propaganda might be successful in the recruitment of marginalized (and other) 
people not through didactic ideological conversion so much as an inherent subcultural 
seduction. Importantly, by constructing this particular jihadi subcultural style, we argue that 
the magazines go beyond instructing their readers in how to live and act – they construct 
particular notions of what might be considered cool, sought-after and idolized. By harnessing 
these techniques, consciously or otherwise, the jihadi magazines effectively echo the 
devastatingly effective tactics of the cultural industries who sell a wide range of products 
worldwide (see Ilan, 2015). Subcultural analysis and cultural criminology can thus be useful, 
if not indispensable, tools for understanding contemporary jihadi propaganda and may 
provide insights for those working to counter all forms of religious and political extremism. 
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